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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
COMMENTS ON LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS AND
ENGINEERS
Gibson B. Witherspoon*
I. HISTORICAL
Under the Code of Hammurabi the Babylonian justice for a
builder was both swift and severe. Death was required "of a
builder's son for a house being so carelessly built as to cause the
death of the owner's son." The Romans continued the vogue
of Lex Talons. From the moment of Babylonian law the pen-
dulum swung to the furthest extreme in English law of no lia-
bility. So drastic a change required nearly four thousand years.
The early British barristers developed a rule that an architect's
or engineer's duty is not merely ministerial but that he is in a
position of an arbitrator between the parties so that he could
not be held liable for the results of his decisions so long as it was
free of fraud or collusion. Although he might decline to give the
grounds of his decision it was held no help to the plaintiff, the
courts ruling that this super arbitrator was not required to set
forth the reasons or basis of his decisions.
The early decisions in America followed the English rule regard-
ing architects and engineers, holding them not liable for negligence
in making -decisions. In modem times the pendulum, however,
is slowly swinging away from the English rules and our early
cases. The architect's or engineer's decision is binding on all
parties but liability is governed by our common law- rules of neg-
ligence. In at least three general classes of cases an architect or
engineer has been held liable for his negligence.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS.
An architect, in preparation of plans, drawings and specifica-
tions, owes to his employer the duty to exercise his skill, ability,
judgment and taste both reasonably and without neglect.' The
0
Member of the firm Witherspoon & Compton, Meridian, Mississippi. Member of
the Mississippi and United States Supreme Court Bars. Associate Editor of the COM-
MERCIAL LAW JOURNAL. Commissioner from Mississippi to the National Conference
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1. Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919); Bayshore Development
v. Bondfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918); Block v. Happ, 144 Ga. 145, 86 S.E.
316 (1915); Trunk & Gorden v. Clark, 63 Iowa 620, 145 N.W. 277 (1914); Kortz v.
Kimberlin, 158 Ky. 566, 165 S.W. 654 (1914); Simpson Bros. Corp. v. Merrimac Chem-
ical Co., 248 Mass. 346, 142 N.E. 922 (1924); Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76
N.W. 62, (1898); Major v. Leary, 241 App. Div. 606, 268 N.Y. Supp, 413 (1933);
White v. Pallay, 119 Ore. 97, 247 Pac. 316 (1926); Presnall v. Adams, (Tex. Civ.
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measure of damages for defects of construction attributable to
lack of skill either in preparation of plans or supervising of con-
struction involves two different rules, depending on the character of
the defect rather than on a difference in the law of the various juris-
dictions. If the defects can be remedied, this cost is the measure
of damages. 2 Where the structure cannot be corrected without
unreasonable or disproportionate expense, the measure of damages
is the difference between the value of the building as designed
and built and the value it would have had if it had been properly
constructed and designed.3 The test is that if the defect is so intim-
ately connected with the body of the structure, or is so inherent
in some permanent part of such structure that it cannot be rem-
edied at reasonable expense or without tearing it down and
rebuilding it, then the proper measure of damages becomes the
difference between the value of the building now and the value
it would have if it had been made upon correct plans and specifi-
cations. 4
Complications arise where there are two causes contributing to
the defect. The architect is only liable for his part thereof but he
is not allowed anything for the preparation of the plans as he
failed to supply proper ones.5 Efficiency of an architect in the
preparation of plans and specifications is tested by the rule of
ordinary and reasonable skill usually exercised by one in that
profession.6 But an architect undertaking to prepare plans does
not imply or guarantee either a perfect plan or satisfactory results.7
These general defects attributed to error in the plans or specifi-
cations of the architect usually occur: (1) the fixtures are not
adequate to their intended use; (2) The roof, floors, or walls
become cracked," buckle, or collapse;9 (3) The foundation is not
App.), 214 S.W. 357 (1919); Shipman v. State, 43 Wis. 381 (1877). This rule is
also followed in Canada, Couchon v. MacCoshamn, 19 D.L.R. 708. Because of the
contractual relation with the owner a principal-agent relationship exists. See generally
6 C.J.S. Architects, § 7 (1937).
2. Schreiner v. Miller, 67 Iowa 91, 24 N.W. 738 (1885); Truck and Gorden v. Clark
163 Iowa 620, 145 N.W. 277 (1914); Barraque v. Naff, 202 La. 360, 11 So. 697
(1892);Dysart-Cook Mule Co. v. Reed & Heckenlively, 114 Mo. App. 296, 89 S.W.
591.(1905),;, Swartz v. Huhn, 71 Misc. 149, 126 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1911); Cheaverin v.
Vail, 61 1R.I. 17, 200 AtI. 462 (1938)..
3. Bayshore Development Co. v. Bondfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918); Truck
& Gorden v,.! Clark, 163 Iowa 620, 145 N.W. 277 (1918).
4. See 3"Am. Jur., Architects §*20 (1936).
5. Boyd v. Foster, 202 Ill. App. 251 (1916); Couchon v. MacCosham, 19 D.L.R. 708.
6. Am. Surety Co. v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061
(1907).
7. White v. Pallay, 119 Ore. 97, 247 Pac. 316 (1926).
8. Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 "SE.2d 885 (1915).
9. School Distiict of Ring Co.- v. Josenbaus," 88 Wash. 624, 153 Pac. 326 (1916).
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sufficient to provide adequate support ° or (4) The waterproof-
ing is not sufficient to prevent leads or seepage. Occasionally
the owner claims that the architect is responsible for defects in
the work which are alleged to have been caused by improper or
unsuitable materials prescribed in the specifications. These are
usually claimed as offset or counterclaims where the architect
sues the owner for fees for preparation of plans and specifica-
tions. 1 But where there is error or oversight in the preparation
of the plans necessitating repairs they nevertheless can not be
made with unnecessary expense or in an extravagant form and
still form a basis for recovery of the amount of the disbursements"2
where an architect is employed to complete a building according
to the plans and specifications of a preceding architect. The
supervising architect was not responsible to the owner for errors
or mistakes in such plans nor could he be held responsible if
the quality of the materials and workmanship prescribed did not
meet the approval and expectation of the owner." The supervising
architect was required to complete the building in a reasonably
careful and skillful manner and in substantial compliance with
the plans and specifications of the original architect who pre-
pared them.
III. LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH
CAUSED BY IMPROPER PLANS OR DESIGNS OR
SPECIFICATIONS.
In early cases frequently it was declared that no cause of action
in tort can arise from a breach of contract unless there is be-
tween the defendant and the injured party what was termed
"privity of contract.' 4 In more modem times this doctrine has been
limited in some jurisdictions, modified in many states, and rejected
by others." The court in New York' 6 held a manufacturer of an
10 White v. Pallay, 119 Ore. 97, 247 Pac. 316 (1926).
11. Stewart v. Boelme, 53 Il. App. 463 (1893).
12. Bayshore Development Co. v. Bondfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918).
13. May v. Howell, 32 Del. 221, 121 Atl. 650 (1923).
14. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence § 21 (1941).
15. 13 A.L.R. 2d 191; 58 A.L.R. 2d 865; 165 A.L.R. 2d 569; Manufacturer's liability
for negligence causing iujury to person or damage to property of ultimate consumer or
user.
10. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. Supp. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Analysis of decisions in which a remote user has recovered in tort from a manufacturer,
supplier or contractor for example are: sudden collapse of an imperfectly constructed
scaffold-Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882); Faulty erection of concrete ceilings-
Adams v. White Construction Co., 299 N.Y. 641, 87 N.E.2d 52 (1949); Breaking of
poorly made handle on coffee urn, Hoening v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485,
6 N.E.2d 415 (1936); Explosion of defectively manufactured soda bottle, Smith v. Peer-
less Class Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932); Explosion of an electric transformer
improperly packed, Rosenbrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571
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inherently dangerous Buick automobile liable for injuries to
remote users. Dean Prosser 17 declared, "There is no visable reason
for any distinction between the liability of one who supplies a
chattel and one who erects a structure." Pennsylvania was one of
the first courts to follow this line of reasoning and held, "There
is no reason to believe that the law governing liability should be,
or is, in any way different where real structures are involved in-
stead of chattels. There is no logical basis for such distinction.
The principle inherent to liability cannot be made to depend
merely upon the technical distinction between a chattel and a
structure built upon the land. 18 Architects, engineers and con-
tractors should be liable to persons witth whom they have io
privity of contract for injuries sustained after the erection of a
dangerous structure under the same principles of negligence
applicable to manufacturers. 9 Some authorities hold that the
proper test of liability is whether the manufacturer, architect, or
builder should recognize that his failure to exercise reasonable
care involves an unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily
harm to those gainfully using the chattel or structure in a manner
and for a purpose for which it was created. 20 Indemnity from
the claims of third persons is due a tortfeasor who has a contract-
ual right to expect his joint tortfeasor to do that which would
have prevented injury if it had been done as agreed. 21 "Thus an
architect or engineer in preparing plans and specifications for the
construction, of a building under employment by the owner, is
following an independent calling, and is doubtless responsible for
any negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary skill of his pro-
fession, which results in the erection of an unsafe structure where-
by anyone lawfully on the premises is injured."2 2 "By undertaking
professional service to a client, an architect impliedly represents
that he possesses, and it is his duty to possess, that degree of learn-
ing and skill ordinarily possessed by architects of good standing
practicing in the same locality. It is his further duty to use the care
ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of his
profession practicing in the same locality; to use reasonable dil-
igence and his best judgment in the exercise of his skill and the
(1923); Where chattel was of a type that is inherently dangerous to human safety, Huset
v. J I. Case, 120 Fed. 865. (1903).
17. Prosser, Torts, § 85, 13 A.L.R.2d 191..
18. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363, Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949); See also
Geore v. Sturgis, 56 .App. D.C. 364, 14 F.2d 250 (1926).
19. Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co. (C.A.N.Y.)., 176 F.2d 237 (1949).
20. Restatement, Torts, § 385 (1936).
21. John Wanamaker v. Otis Elevator Co: 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718 (1923).
22. Potter v. Gilbert, 115 N.Y. 9upp. 423,90 N.E. 1165 (1910).
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application of his learning in an effort to accomplish the purpose
for which he is employed."2 3  But there are limitations on the
duties of an architect. "The responsibility of an architect does not
differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When he possesses the
requisite skill and knowledge and in the exercise thereof has used
his best judgment, he has done all that the law requires. The arc-
hitect is not a warrantor of his plans and specifications. The result
may show a mistake or defect, although he may have exercised the
reasonable skill required.."24
An architect was held not liable when he was employed by a
school trustee to draw plans and specifications for a school build-
ing which met with the approval of the trustee, where a child fell
over a wall onto a concrete floor. The alleged negligence was
based on the absence of a guard rail. 2 The court laid great stress
on the theory that a public officer invested with discretoin
when exercising his judgment in matters brought before him, is
immune from liability to persons who may be injured as the re-
sult of an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided he acts within
the scope of his authority and without willfulness, malice or cor-
ruption."6 The court held that the architect was employed simply
to draw plans and specifications for the school building, that the
plans and specifications were submitted to -the trustee, discussed,
changed, modified and -corrected, and finally approved, and that
this circumstance was sufficient to relieve the architect of liability.
"It would be a strange rule of law which would excuse the act of
the official in passing upon the plans and adjudging them suffi-
cient and yet would hold the person who drew them liable in
damages because of alleged incompetence."'
The third classification involves those cases where injuries or
death result to persons working on a structure when it collapses
as a result of the architect's defective plans or designs. These
cases arise before the building is completed. The two previous
illustrative classifications arose after completion.
In an interesting and illustrative case, the architect was held
liable.27 The plaintiff's intestate was employed by a contractor
engaged in the erection of structural steel for a grandstand. Fatal
23. Paxton v. Alameda: Coun .11,0 Cal. App.2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953).
24. Bayne v. Everhan, 197 Mich . 161, 163 N.W., 1002 (1917).
25. Sherman v. Miller Contrut& i. C 90 Ind. App. 462, 158 NE. 255 (1926).
28. 43 Am. Ju. Negligence. § 21 (.14.).
27. Clemens v. Beniihger, 211 ApP. Div,. 586, : )7 -N.LY.:5tipp. 539 (1925).
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injuries were sustained when he was struck by a steel column
which fell because a wrong type of bolt had been used to anchor
it to concrete which had not hardened sufficiently to bear the strain
of the column. Judgment was rendered against the contractor who
did the concrete work, the contractor doing the structural steel
work, and the architect who was also supervising the work. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment and liability of the architect.
Liability could be predicated on his supervisory activities, namely
his failure to notify the contractor engaged in the erection of
structural steel of the true conditions, after authorizing and di-
recting the placing of the anchor bolts in the drilled holes with
their strength as supports wholly dependent on the resistance of
the unhardened cement, or it could have been based on the defect
of the original plans in which the type of anchor bolt to be used
was not specified. The architect approved the detailed plans pre-
pared by the contractor in which the improper type of bolt was
specified. "For defects in the original plans and the approval of
detailed plans arising from negligence on the part of the architect,
liabililty resulted." Where there is a latent or concealed defect
resulting in injury, liability results."28 '
IV. LIABILITY OF ARCHITECT OR ENGINEER FOR
IMPROPER ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE.
The American Institute of Architects has zealously fought to
preserve the high standing of all architects in the courts of the
nation and especially to preserve the immunity which its members
have enjoyed for centuries. The members of this outstanding
Association are loyal and fraternal in the defense of their mem-
bers, and the attorney who tries to prove lack of good faith, fraud,
failure to exercise skill and care, or even simple negligence, is
confronted by a most difficult situation. The problem is analogous
to that of a plaintiff in a malpractice case who wishes to produce a
disinterested doctor. In all the early cases, and even at the present
time, the architect's certificate is agreed to be conclusive as be-
tween the parties, and as he is acting in a dual capacity and as a
quasiarbitrator there is no resulting liability.29 The reasoning of
these early cases was based on the contract wherein the plaintiff
owner and defendant contractor had both agreed that the archi-
tects would be the sole arbitrator.30 Then the court held that
28. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 488, 95,N.E.2d 802 (1950).
29. 42 L.R.A.N.S. 282.
30. Corey v. Eastmen, 166 Mass. 229, 44 N.E. 217, (186).
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where an architect was negligent in approving a contractor's claim
for a greater amount than was actually due, he was liable to the
owner for the excess payments made in reliance on the certificate
but not for the cost of completing the building in accordance
with the contract terms.3' Where defects in construction were
discovered after a supervising architect had given the final certifi-
cate, evidence of such defects might give rise to a claim for
damages in recoupment in the architect's action for his services,
but a showing of negligence did not constitute a complete defense
to the claim for compensation. Architects being skilled persons
are held to a higher degree of care than unskilled persons and if
they fail in the duty owed either in the preparation of the plans
or in the supervision of the work liability would result for the
damages proved by the owner. 3
Where a roof collapsed after an architect, who prepared plans
and supervised the work, gave his final certificate, the court rejected
the theory that progress payments were merely authorization for
the contractor to draw a proportionate part of his pay. The fact
that the condition which caused the collapse was known to the
owner was held not to preclude recovery since the owner was
entitled to rely on the sufficiency of the construction as certified by
the architect. The certificates given during the progress of the
work were each evidence that the work had been satisfactorily
completed by the contractor.3
A supervising architect who acted fraudulently or in collusion
with one of the parties in issuing payment certificates was held
liable for all resulting damages. There is a question of fact pre-
sented when a case involves an architect's negligence in issuing
a certificate, but a false certificate based on fraud or collusion
renders the architect liable for all damages, as he owes an owner a
fiduciary duty of both liability and good faith.35
In a well-reasoned case it was held that where the contract
required a contractor to submit to the architect evidence that
payrolls and bills for materials had been paid before a certificate
of substantial completion was to be issued, it was negligence
resulting in liability if the architect failed to require such evid-
ence and by issuing his certificate released the retainage. The
31. Bump v. McGrannahan, 61 Ind. App. 136, 111 N.E. 640 (1916).
32. Lindberg v. Hodgen, 89 Misc. 454, 152 N.Y.- Sipp. 229- (1915).
33. Pierson v. Tyndall, 28 S.W. 232, (Tex. 1894).
34. School District v. Josenhabs, 88 Wash'. 624, 153 Pac. 326 (1915).
35. Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App. 2d 44, 273 P,2d 306. (1954).
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surety had a right of subrogation, since it was entitled to protection.
The court rejected the contention that the architect could not be
held liable because there was no privity of contract between the
architect and the surety. The duty to ascertain that the contractor
had paid the bills was owed both to the building owner and the
surety, for whose mutual protection the retainage was provided.
The failure of the architect to exercise due care and diligence in
carrying out his duties might result in loss to the surety when he
undertook the performance of an act which, if negligently done,
would result in loss, so that the law imposed upon him the duty
to exercise due care to avoid such loss even in the absence of a
contractual relationship. The fact the surety had taken no steps
to ascertain that the outstanding bills for labor and materials were
being paid by the contractor was held not to charge it with con-
tributory negligence, since it had the right to assume that the
retainage would not be released until the contract had been fully
performed2 t
Thus we see that either an architect or an engineer may be
liable in these three general classes of cases:
1. For defects or insufficiency of work attributable to plans
or specifications.
36. State of Miss. for the use of National Surety Corp. v. Malvaney et al, 72 So.
2d 424, 43 A.L.R. 2d 1212. The rights accruing to the surety date back to the time
the bond was executed. Canton Exchange Bank v. Yazoo Co., 144 Miss. 579 (1926);
Derby v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 87 Ore. 34, 169 Pac. 500 (1917); Southern Surety Co.
v. Schlesinger, 114 Ohio St. 323, 151 N.E. 177 (1926). Surety's right to retainage
is protected under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Ohio Gas Co. v. Galvin, 222
Iowa 670, 269 N.W. 254 (1936). Paying surety has right to retained percentage and
superior to those of a lending bank which is a volunteer and common creditor. Am. Bank
v. Lanston, 180 Ark. 643, 22 S.W.2d 381 (1929).
The famous MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1950)
overruled the early theory of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109 (1842) which
had been cited since 1842, which held there was no liability of a contracting party
to one with whom he had no privity. Exceptions had been recognized to this general
rule either where the seller of chattels knew that it was dangerous for its intended use
or ii the chattel was of a type inherently dangerous to human safety. See Lewis v. Terry,
111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896) and Schubert v.J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51
N.W. 1103 (1898).
In the Malvaney case the defendant unsuccessfully raised five separate defenses and
Justice Holmes decided all of these theoris against the architect:
1. There was no privity of contract between the architect and the surety and there-
fore no duty was owed the surety and no damages could be recovered regardless of
negligence.
2. That retainage is not a trust fund and therefore there is no lien thereon either
legal or equitable for the benefit of the surety.
3. If the surety had a cause of action, it did not keep up with the project and
architect was entitled to the defense of contributory negligence.
4. That by agreement of, the parties the architect was the sole judge of what evidence
should be required that the material bills were paid and he acted in a quasi judicial
capacity.
5. f the surety had any right under equitable subrogation it did not accrue until either
tho date the contractor gave notice of his default or when the surety actually paid the
outstanding bills for materials.
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2. For personal injuries or death resulting from improper plans
or designs; and
3, For improper issuance of certificates either for progress pay-
ments or for the final estimate.
Liability coverage for the architect or engineer now seems a
necessity for those professions just as it has become advisable
for attorneys, doctors, dentists, and other professional people. A
claim could be quietly and satisfactorily handled by an insurance
adjuster, but a law suit against either an architect or an engineer,
in addition to the financial loss, might ruin his future business
reputation with his public.
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